Never Again? The United Nations and Genocide: A Doomed Mission?

Maria Terrinoni
Dr. Haywood
HS490: Senior Thesis

Terrinoni 1
Abstract
Despite their commitment to international peace and security and to the concept of “never
again,” the United Nations has failed to end the many genocides of the late 20th century. In this
thesis, I use the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and in the Yugoslav Wars (1991-1999) as case
studies to understand the UN’s response to genocide and to attempt to understand why the UN
cannot effectively respond to and end genocide. I discover that issues such as the limitations of
the Genocide Convention, the importance of state sovereignty, and overall institutional failures
of the United Nation make any attempt to end genocide doomed. I end the discussion by
examining ways the UN has attempted to fix these inadequacies, but ultimately come to the
conclusion that their attempts have been futile and have allowed for genocides to continue into
the twenty-first century, using the case studies of the Rohingya in Myanmar and the Uyghurs in
China. Throughout this paper, I use a number of sources to develop my answer. Primary sources
include sources such as eye-witness interviews, UN released reports, independent fact finding
research, UN documents such as the UN Charter and Genocide Convention, and documents from
the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda (ICTR) and in Yugoslavia (ICTY). My secondary
sources come from scholarly articles and books, newspaper articles, articles issued by think
tanks, and museum resources.
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Introduction
Holocaust survivor Primo Levi once took comfort in the knowledge that something like
the Holocaust could never happen to him again. But as the 1980s came to a close, he wrote in an
essay, "The one thing was certain, is that it can happen again, anywhere."1 Unfortunately, many
events of the 20th century post-Holocaust proved him painfully correct, especially during the
1990s. The mass atrocities that occured post-Holocaust has led many scholars, most notably
Samantha Power, to refer to the 20th century as the “age of genocide.” Ironically, after the end of
World War II and the fall of the Nazi regime, the international community made a pledge to
“never again” allow such an atrocity like the Holocaust to occur.2 This pledge was supported by
actions such as the establishment of the 1948 Genocide Convention, which was meant to ensure
that genocide could never happen again while the outside world watched on.3 Despite the
rhetoric of “never again,” the events of the 20th century have proven to be a failure of the
international community, more specifically the United Nations, especially in the genocides of
Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Within the frameworks of the United Nations, there are a number of
issues that make it difficult to pressure states to end genocide in a timely effective fashion, such
as the technicalities and definitional issues of the term genocide, the issue of sovereignty, the
physical structure of international institutions, the lack of cooperation among member states, and
competing national security interests.
The course of this paper will proceed by first discussing the history and formation of the
United Nations. Following this discussion, we will discuss the Genocide Convention which was
meant to ensure that states could not be passive onlookers to genocide, but rather active
1
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opponents to those committing genocide. Following these discussions, we will then turn to the
two case studies of the genocides of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, discussing the background, the
facts of the case, and the international responses. Out of the many genocides that occured
throughout the 20th century, I decided to focus on these two case studies as they both occurred
shortly after the collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold War, and after the UN made a
renewed promise to human rights with the development of the Agenda for Peace. In addition to
the general timing, I chose these two cases due to their location. Despite one happening on the
continent of Africa and one happening in Europe, both genocides received relatively little
intervention from the UN. Upon discussing these two case studies, this paper will conclude by
examining the possible reasons for why the United Nations failed to intervene in both genocides
within a timely and effective fashion.

Research Methodology
Throughout this paper, I have used a variety of sources to formulate my argument. The
types of sources have differed for each section, varying from eye-witness interviews,
documentaries, scholarly articles, books, newspaper articles, reports released by organizations
like the UN and Human Rights Watch, as well as from independent researchers, UN primary
documents, museum exhibits, articles released by think tanks and human rights organizations,
and primary documents from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). In my first two sections, focusing largely
on the formation of the United Nations and the drafting of the Genocide Convention, my main
sources consisted of primary documents released by the United Nations, such as the UN Charter
and the draft resolution of the Genocide Convention. I also used a number of scholarly sources to
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compose a timeline and history of the UN formation, as well as the procedures that eventually
led to the Genocide Convention. These scholarly sources were also used in my discussion of the
limitations of the Genocide Convention. In my next two sections, focusing on the Rwandan and
Yugoslavian Genocides, my main sources consisted of scholarly writing that also referenced
eyewitness accounts. I was also informed by documentaries released by Frontline PBS. Other
sources consisted of primary documents and reports released by bodies like the Physicians for
Human Rights and the International Center for Transitional Justice. In these sections, I focus
solely on the history and timeline of the two genocides. For this reason, I relied on one or two
main sources to establish a history, with supporting evidence from other sources. In my next
section, focusing on why the UN has failed to intervene, I again mainly use scholarly sources. In
this section, I make the bulk of my argument focusing on why the UN has failed to intervene in
genocide cases. I argue that the limitations imposed by the defintion of genocide, the importance
of state sovereignty, and the institutional structuring of the UN, specifically the veto power
possessed by the UN Security Council which allows them to protect their national interests, are
all reasons why the UN has failed in the field of human rights abuses. These arguments are then
supported by other scholarly sources. Finally, my conclusion includes a discussion regarding the
current events happening to the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and the Uyghur Muslims in
China. All information in this section is provided from newspaper articles and from reports
released from the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights as well as independent researchers.
I found all these sources to be incredibly useful in my research. I found documentaries to
be particularly helpful in allowing me to understand the timelines of my two case studies. While
none of the documentaries are directly cited, they did allow me to understand more fully the
scholarly sources I was pulling my information from. I also found eyewitness accounts to be
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helpful in humanizing the situations I was discussing. However, I did find some limitations in my
sources, such as finding sources that directly addressed the research question I was examining.
Many of my sources, which focused on the same issues I was examining, took a different
approach than I was thinking. For example, in my research regarding UN intervention, some of
my sources focused more on how UN intervention represents Western intervention, and
therefore, can be considered a continuation of colonial power over non-Western powers. Others
took more bottom up approaches, where the solution for genocides comes from the country itself
(solving its social, economic, political, etc. problems first). While I found these arguments to be
interesting, and certainly true (in varying degrees of importance), my paper was not meant to
focus on colonial ramifications or indigenous perspectives. I wanted a very high level
understanding for why the UN did not intervene, not why genocides as such may come to be or
their ramifications thereafter.

History and Formation of International Organizations
While the history of international organizations can be traced back all the way to the
Vienna Convention in 1815, for the purposes of this paper, the history of international
organizations will mainly focus on the period of World War II and onward. I will also only be
focusing on the United Nations. The United Nations represented one of the first formations of the
international community working as one body. It was meant to promote international peace and
security, including the protection of fundamental human rights.4 When states join the UN, they
promise to take “joint and separate action” to protect these human rights.5 Because of this
4

Reinalda, Bob. 2009. Routledge History of International Organizations : From 1815 to the Present Day. London:
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promise and their obligations as signatories of the Genocide Convention, all states in the United
Nations should have come to the aid of Rwanda and Yugoslavia during their respective
genocides, unless they could somehow claim that they were not actually genocides.
As previously stated, the goal of states working together is not a new concept, and could
be traced back to 1815. The first establishment of international organizations began in 1865,
when organizations, such as the International Telegraph Union, were formed to focus on
specialized issues.6 Beginning in 1899, states turned their attention to working on a plan for
peace among nations. At the International Peace Conference in The Hague, states adopted the
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and established the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, where they discussed how to maintain peace and prevent war. 7 This
Convention was activated in 1902.8 Unfortunately, the Convention was unable to prevent the
start of World War I. After witnessing the atrocities of the War, states began to put their efforts
back towards maintaining world peace. In order to do so, states established the League of
Nations.9 The League was formed for a number of reasons. The main reason for the League’s
establishment was “to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security.”10
Others argue that its establishment allowed it to maintain the great-power cooperation of World
War I, as well as change the matter of war to “dispute resolution.11” However, with the United
States failing to join the League of Nations12 and the departure of belligerent states like Japan13
6

United Nations. “Predecessor.” United Nations. Accessed November 12, 2021.
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7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Alvarez, José E. “International Organizations: Then and Now.” The American Journal of International Law 100,
no. 2 (2006): 324–47. 325. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3651150.
10
United Nations. “Predecessor.”
11
Alvarez, “International Organizations: Then and Now.” 325.
12
"The League of Nations, 1920." U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 12, 2021.
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/99150.htm.
13
Clare, John D. "A League of Nations and Manchuria Invasion." Manchuria. November 27, 2018. Accessed
December 14, 2021. https://www.johndclare.net/EL5.htm.
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and Germany,14 it ultimately failed in its goal to prevent war, eventually leading to the start of
World War II.
During World War II and onward, the Allies, among other states, worked to ensure that
once the war ended, something like it could never happen again. Throughout the war, the Allied
leadership met to discuss what the world would look like post-war. This conversation first began
with multiple state representatives on June 12, 1941, with the Declaration of St. James Palace.15
Within this document, states agreed that they must all willingly cooperate in order to maintain
peace and “economic and social security.”16 Following this Declaration, on August 14, 1941, two
of the Allied leaders, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, met to discuss
what came to be known as the Atlantic Charter. 17 The Atlantic Charter is often seen as the origin
charter of the United Nations, as it called for the “establishment of a wider and permanent
system of general security,”18 and was even the first time the term “united nations” was used in
an official document.19 Other principles within the Charter called for peace and safety within
state boundaries, and that “all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from
want and fear.”20 Those who decided to sign onto the Charter were promising “to defend life,
liberty, independence and religious freedom and to preserve human rights and justice in their
own lands as well as in other lands.”21 The Declaration was then issued on January 1, 1942,22 and

14

The National Archives. “Credibility and End of The League.” The National Archives. The National Archives,
December 30, 2008.
https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/blows-credibility-end-league.htm#:~:text=The%20peace
keeping%20role%20of%20the,to%20an%20end%20in%201946.
15
United Nations. "Preparatory Years." United Nations. Accessed November 12, 2021.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Reinalda. 2009. Routledge History of International Organizations : From 1815 to the Present Day. London:
Routledge. 276.
20
Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations : From 1815 to the Present Day, 274.
21
Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations : From 1815 to the Present Day, 276.
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officially became known as the Declaration by United Nations.23 In 1943, representatives from
the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and China met in Moscow where they adopted a
declaration recognizing the “necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general
international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving
States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”24 In the following year, the four countries met again at
Dumbarton Oaks. At this meeting, the four states published the Proposals for the Establishment
of a General International Organization, in which they outlined objectives such as “maintain[ing]
international peace and security, fostering friendly relations among nations, and promoting
international cooperation.”25 More discussion continued among FDR, Winston Churchill, and
Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference in 1945, where they worked to solve issues unresolved
from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.26 The UN Charter was then finalized in San Francisco, at
the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) between April 25 and
June 26, 1945, where the United Nations was officially conceived.27 The Conference was greatly
influenced by the work of the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and China from their
previous meetings at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta. 28 Delegates of fifty nations agreed upon the
following principles of the UN Charter, among others: international peace and security, peaceful
resolution of disputes, fundamental human rights, and equal rights, all of which would be made
possible through the establishment of the United Nations.29 The United Nations would work to
promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
23

United Nations. “Preparatory Years.”
Ibid.
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Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations : From 1815 to the Present Day, 282.
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all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”30 The United Nations officially
began on October 24, 1945.31 Since its creation, the UN has been the primary actor in creating
international human rights norms.32
While the UN’s main purpose is to work to establish international peace and security,
throughout the twentieth century they often have failed to do so. In terms of preventing genocide,
the UN has failed time and time again.33 As will be further explored in this paper, the UN has
failed to prevent the genocides of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. They have also failed to prevent
genocide in places such as, “Bangladesh, Burundi, East Timor, Indonesia, Iraq… Cambodia
[and] Guatemala.”34 Throughout the Cold War period of 1945-1989, the UN’s ideological
reliance on realpolitik (practical matters over ethical matters)35 led to the UN’s neglect of the
issue of genocide in favor of national security interests.36 The US and USSR would ignore the
genocides being committed by their allies as long as that meant their respective strategic interests
would be insured.37 Once the Cold War came to an end, the UN was hopeful that these
inadequacies would disappear as there were no longer two ideologically different superpowers
stalemating action. In order to work towards this, the Secretary General developed an Agenda for
Peace which was meant to “reinvigorate UN enforcement efforts and bring to fruition the early
hope envisioned at the outset of the establishment of the United Nations” of the Security
Council’s role as “global peacekeeper.”38 Despite the renewed hope in the UN’s ability to stop
30
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genocide and bring peace following the Cold War, the genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia were
still able to continue with virtually no UN interference shortly after the Security General’s
statement.

What is Genocide?
The term “genocide” originated following World War II, in connection with the
prosecution of Nazi leaders during the Nuremberg trial.39 The term was first coined, and later
advocated for, by Raphael Lemkin.40 Dr. Raphael Lemkin, who was Polish and Jewish, did not
begin his advocacy for the concept of genocide because of the Holocaust, but rather began to
pursue this line of thinking a number of years before.41 His work first began in 1933 because of
the massacre of Christian Assyrians by the Iraqis. 42 He compared its similarities to the slaughter
of Armenians in Turkey in World War I, and began to wonder how to possibly prevent such
atrocities, or as he then called them, “acts of barbarism.”43 His first proposal to outlaw such acts
was to the League of Nations in 1933, but unfortunately, his proposal failed and led to the
disapproval of the Polish government, as they were working towards conciliation with Nazi
Germany.44 Beginning in 1939, Dr. Lemkin began to personally experience the aggressions of
Nazi Germany.45 After six months of hiding in Polish forests, he escaped to Sweden where he
continued to study the Nazi occupation and he “identified the instruments used to systematically
eliminate a people.”46 It was during this time that he developed the term genocide. The term
39

Schabas, William A. "Origins of the Genocide Convention: From Nuremberg to Paris." Case Western Reserve
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40
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genocide was developed using two words. The first, genos, comes from the Greek language and
means race or tribe; the second, cide, comes from the Latin language and means killing.47
Genocide was therefore understood as the killing of a tribe, race, or people. This term was then
coined and published in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Germany.48 In the years following the
introduction of the term, Lemkin had to work incessantly to have it become recognized by the
international community, as the community was more focused on prosecuting crimes against
humanity at the Nuremberg Trials.49
While the term was first published in 1944, it did not become officially recognized by the
international community until December 9, 1948, when the Genocide Convention was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly. 50 Though Raphael Lemkin was a strong advocate of
adoption of the term, many in the international community saw no reason for distinguishing
genocide from the already known idea of crimes against humanity. However, after the
Nuremberg trials failed to punish crimes committed before the war, three UN member states,
Cuba, Panama, and India, proposed a resolution to fix the inherent problems of using the
framework of crimes against humanity.51 Their resolution included two main objectives: an
acknowledgement that genocide could happen during peacetime, and that genocide falls under
universal jurisdiction.52 Due to state disagreements, the final resolution was more toned down
than the first proposal, but it did begin the process of what would eventually become the

47
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Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, or the Genocide
Convention of 1948.53
As explained by William Schabas, a professor of International Law at the National
University of Ireland in Galway and the director of the Irish Center for Human Rights, the
development process of the Genocide Convention occurred in three stages. Throughout all three
stages, there was continuous controversy over the relationship between genocide and crimes
against humanity; with some states arguing that genocide was under the umbrella of crimes
against humanity and did not need to be separately defined, and other states arguing that the term
had to be defined in order to make it a chargeable offense during peacetime.54 The first stage of
the Genocide Convention began with the drafting of the convention. This stage was led by the
Secretariat, with the help of three experts: Dr. Raphael Lemkin, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, and
Vespasian V. Pella.55 This draft was then sent to the Committee on the Progressive Development
of International Law and Its Codification for comment.56 At this stage, France first challenged
separating genocide from crimes against humanity as “useless and even dangeous neologism” (a
new or recent word attempting to enter the mainstream),57 perhaps because they were afraid it
could be used against them for their actions during peacetime. During the draft’s consideration at
the second session of the General Assembly, other countries like the UK were similarly against
separating the term genocide from crimes against humanity, while many “third world” countries
advocated and fought for the term’s separation and autonomy in order to protect themselves
against larger powers.58 The second stage involved a reworking of the draft by an ad hoc
committee. During this stage, the debate between the relationship between genocide and crimes
53
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against humanity continued.59 As some form of compromise between the two opposing groups,
the ad hoc committee decided that genocide should be characterized as a “crime against
mankind.”60 The final stage concluded with the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly
agreeing on the text and submitting it to the General Assembly for adoption. 61 During this stage,
the argument between genocide and crimes against humanity continued. France continued to be
the leading country arguing that genocide falls under crimes against humanity and should not be
separated.62 On the opposing side, countries, such as Brazil, argued that, while crimes against
humanity did encompass genocide, genocide still had to be defined separately because it was a
crime that could also be committed during peace time (while crimes against humanity could only
be committed during wartime).63
Following these three stages and their contentious debates, the Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, or the Genocide Convention, was
unanimously voted in by the 56 members at the 179th plenary meeting and was adopted on
December 9, 1948, by the United Nations.64 The Convention eventually went into force on
January 12, 1951.65 According to the UN, the drafting of this Convention symbolized the
international community’s commitment of “never again.”66 And in the view of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the principles of the Convention have become general customary
international law, and therefore, the Convention is binding on all states regardless of their

59
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Convention ratification status.67 The Convention contains a number of articles important to the
term genocide. Article II is arguably the most important article as it defines what genocide
means, and the conditions that must be met in order to trigger state obligations. The definition is
as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
While the definition of genocide is extremely important, there are still some other important
aspects of the Genocide Convention to note. One of these aspects resolves the debate between
the relationship of genocide and crimes against humanity that occurred all throughout the
development of the Convention. Within Article I of the Convention, all Contracting Parties
agreed that “genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”68 Furthermore, within the
Convention, there are certain obligations which all states must follow whether or not they have
ratified the Convention. These obligations include to do all they can to prevent and punish the
crime of genocide, as well as the obligations to not commit genocide and to give effective
penalities for those charged with genocide.69 Essentially, the Genocide Convention compels all

67
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signatory states to act once a genocide is known to be happening. This obligation will be central
to my argument concerning the UN and the events in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

The Rwandan Genocide
Beginning in the spring and summer of 1994, Rwanda saw “the most unambiguous case
of state-sponsored genocide in an attempt to exterminate a category of humanity, a people, since
the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews of Europe.”70 Within 100 days, over 800,000 people were
intentionally killed by the Rwandan Hutu government simply because they were Tutsi.71 The
genocide that occurred so quickly in Rwanda was one based on ethnic difference72 between the
Hutu majority (about 85%) and the Tutsi minority (about 15%).73 While many in the
international community like to argue that the fighting between the two groups is one that stems
back to an ancient hatred, this is simply not the case. The Hutu and Tutsi groups are extremely
similar, sharing “the same language and culture; the same clan names, the same customs, and the
[same] symbols of kingship [that] served as a powerful unifying bond between them.”74 It was
not until Belgian colonization and their divide and conquer strategy that the Hutu and Tutsi
became a distinct ethnicity with hatreds towards the other group.75 When the Belgians arrived in
the early 1900s, they brought with them the idea of race science and racial groups.76 The
Belgians created an apartheid system in Rwanda,77 forcing the two ethnic groups to carry around
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ethnic identity cards.78 The system created then worked to privilege the Tutsi minority, while
oppressing the Hutu majority.79 This inevitably led to hatred among the two groups, with the
Hutus now looking at the Tutsi in a racist manner, portraying them as alien, clever, and unable to
be a member of the national community.80
In the late 1950s and with the onset of the African liberation movements, Rwanda began
to push for its independence from the Belgians.81 In Rwanda, the Hutu majority pushed for
revolution and eventually reversed the system set in place by the Belgians.82 However, the Hutu
majority left the Belgian apartheid system intact, and instead placed themselves at the top of the
hierarchy.83 For the next thirty years, the Hutu ruled by keeping the Tutsi in a position of political
and social inferiority. The Hutu government “systematically discriminated against [the Tutsi] and
periodically subjected [them] to waves of killing and ethnic cleansing.”84 The violence inflicted
on the Tutsi minority by the Hutu government led many Tutsi individuals to flee to neighboring
countries as refugees.85 This is the background that eventually led to the civil war of 1990, when
groups of armed Tutsi exiles who wished to return home invaded Rwanda from the Ugandan
border.86 The Tutsi exile group came to be known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and
continued to fight against the Hutu government.87 The war continued on and off from 1990 up
until 1993.88 In 1993, a cease-fire was arranged between the two groups, eventually leading to
the Arusha Accords, which stated the two groups would share power. 89 Many Hutu disapproved
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of the Accords and despite the cease-fire, Hutu extremists continued to kill and terrorize Tutsi
and the Hutu politicians that supported peace.90 The Hutu dictator, President Habyarimana, was
even quoted as saying the “threat of peace was even greater than the threat of war, because it
amounted to a defeat.”91 Throughout this period, the extremist Hutus killed several thousand
Rwandans and detained about 9,000.92 To stop this slaughter and ensure the establishment of the
Arusha Accords, UN Peacekeepers, led by Romèo Dallaire, were sent to Rwanda on what was
known as the UN Assistance Mission In Rwanda, or UNAMIR, in 1993. 93 This Mission was
barely supported by the UN, as the Mission received second hand vehicles from the former UN
Cambodia mission where only about 80 out of 300 were viable, they lacked medical supplies and
were not given a restock, and they had poorly trained personnel,94 all because no member state
wanted to pay the major expenses associated with properly funding the mission.
It was during the establishment of the Arusha Accords when individuals first started
warning the United Nations about rumblings of genocidal killings. In what came to be known as
the Dallaire Fax, Dalliare told the United Nations that an informant stated that the Hutus “had
been ordered to register all the Tutsi in Kigali.”95 This informant, who became known as
Jean-Pierre, told Dalliare he believed it was for their ultimate extermination.96 The informant was
later revealed to be a former member of President Habyarimana’s security staff.97 In fact, he
actually served as the head of a Kigali interahamwe (Hutu militia groups) training program.98 In
the information that he provided Dallaire, Jean-Pierre warned of a genocidal plan calling for
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extermination of part of the Rwandan population, as well as threats against UN peacekeepers.99
Despite the warnings of genocide in Rwanda, the UN did nothing and treated the fax “as a
routine bureacratic matter,” as authorized by UN mandate rules.100 Because of bureaucratic
procedures, they actually had to inform President Habyarimana of the fax, which ultimately
informed the President there was a leak within his administration.101 Despite knowing of the
possibility of a genocide in Rwanda, the UN took no action to stop it.
While there had been sporadic ethnic killings throughout the beginning of the 90s, the
real genocide did not begin until April 6, 1994, when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot
down and he was killed.102 Soon after the news broke, Rwandan authorities announced a curfew
and erected roadblocks.103 Hutu extremists were quick to use the plane crash as an excuse to
attack Tutsis, who they immediately blamed for the crash104 (though there has been speculation
that the crash was actually the doing of the President’s inner circle in order to provide a reason
for the following genocide).105 It became clear within a few hours that the streets were being
taken over by Hutu militias and that they were targeting anyone who expressed support for the
Arusha Accords, 106 as well as any Hutu politician affiliated with the Democratic Republic
Movement (MDR) or the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Tutsi leaders, and anyone suspected of
RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front aka the Tutsi rebels) sympathies.107 These actions were not
spontaneous killings. Rather, the individuals to be killed were broadcasted on one of Rwanda’s
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national radio channels, Radio-Television Mille Collines.108 Their personal information such as
names, addresses, and license-plate numbers, were broadcasted for all to hear, and Hutu
extremists did the rest.109 Within 48 hours of the plane crash, massacres began to occur all across
the country, such as in Nyamata, Musha, and Karubamba.110 The international response to the
violent outbreak that followed the plane crash was to evacuate all their people from the country.
As reported by Samantha Power, “in the three days during which some 4,000 foreigners were
evacuated, about 20,000 Rwandans were killed.”111
Once the genocidal killings began, they proceeded in a rapid fashion. The Rwandan
Genocide is widely considered as a low-technolgy genocide. Orders to kill were given through
the Hutu government-owned radio station, Radio-Television Milles Collines.112 The Hutu
government utilized this radio channel to mobilize the population to kill Tutsi all throughout the
country.113 Because of this, killings occurred on a local scale and were carried out in an
extremely brutal manner with the following items: “machetes, massues (clubs studded with
nails), small axes, knives, grenades, guns, fragmentation grenades, beatings to death,
amputations with exsanguination, live burials, drowning, or rape.”114 Militias would also cut the
Achilles tendons of victims to “immobilize them so that they could be finished off later.”115
According to eyewitnesses, many of those participating in these genocidal acts were often local
government authorities. One account describes these authorities as setting fires to houses and
destroying properties.116 The eyewitness also describes, “they would shoot at a hundred or two
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hundred people. It is all former soldiers who killed us. Those who fell over were beaten up with
clubs or hacked to death.”117 The interahamwe’s brutality did not stop there. A 24 year old
eyewitness describes how he was forced to kill his own brother in order “to prove” that his
family were not agents or sympathizers of the RPF.118 In addition to killing, the interahamwe also
participated in the rapes of women all across Rwanda. One 17 year old girl describes how three
men raped her in turns. She states, “as the last one finished, a new group of interahamwe arrived.
They ordered the man who raped me last to rape me again. He refused. Then they threatened to
burn both of us alive unless he raped me again. So he raped me again.”119
Despite the atrocties occuring in Rwanda and varying estimates of between
500,000-2,000,000 people murdered (the figures are highly contested, but estimates usually fall
around 800,000 killed within 100 days),120 the UN took no action to help the Rwandan people. In
fact, they did the exact opposite. Reeling from the 1993 experience in Somalia, the United States
remained apprehensive about intervening in Rwanda and played a large role in preventing the
United Nations from doing so.121 The Pentagon also feared that intervention in Rwanda would
lead to long-term, costly engagement of the United States Military.122 Belgium, who also wanted
to leave Rwanda, turned to the US for support for a full UN exit.123 Samantha Power describes
US policy in the case of Rwanda as: “no U.S. military intervention, robust demands for a
withdrawal of all of Dallaire's forces, and no support for a new UN mission that would challenge
the killers.”124 When questioned by the press about what was happening in Rwanda, US
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representatives would only refer to what was happening in Rwanda as “acts of genocide,” but not
genocide.125 In fact, an official from the Office of the Secretary Of Defense even noted that US
officials had to be careful to avoid using words that insinuated genocide as a genocide finding
could lead the government to “do something.”126 In addition, US policy followed the Presidential
Decision Directive 25, which essentially called for the United States to pressure other countries
into following non-intervention policies.127
Perhaps influenced by US policies and lobbying, the UN Security Council eventually
decided to dramatically decrease the size of Dallaire’s peacekeeping forces down to 270 men.128
Madeleine Albright described the “small, skeletal” operation as a symbol of “the will of the
international community,”129 or in reality a lack thereof. However, as the number of deaths
continued to rise, the Security Council began to consider sending in a more powerful force to end
the slaughter.130 Dallaire requested that the UN follow an inside-out approach to end the
genocide, which focused on sending an additional 5,000 well-armed soldiers who could secure
Kigali and then workout outwards to the countrysides.131 Whereas the US proposed an outside-in
approach, which would create protection zones along the border that Tutsi refugees would then
have to travel to on their own.132 Being that most Tutsis were unable to safely make it to the safe
zones, Daillaire described the US proposal as a “mission…to put on a show at no risk.”133 The
US eventually agreed to Daillaire’s plan, but only once it was too late. The genocide had already
been ended by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.134 The damage had already been done.
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The Yugoslavian Genocide
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Republic of Yugoslavia entered an almost ten year
period of turmoil, on and off wars, and genocidal violence. Throughout this period, thousands of
people, of all ethnic groups (Bosnians, Serbs, Croats, Albanians, etc.), were murdered, tortured,
raped, and forced into exile.135 While there are a number of explanations for the violence that
erupted throughout the 90s, they all focus on one factor: the power vacuum left when
communism began to decline in the late 1980s. This power vacuum allowed politicians like
Slobodan Milošević to come to power and spout the language of ethno-nationalism and religious
hatreds. In this paper, I will focus on only two main explanations that scholars have attempted to
explain this period of turmoil. The first mirrors explanations posed for the genocide in Rwanda;
this theory is known as the “ancient hatreds” theory, and bases the violence off of inevitable
‘age-old’ conflicts between differing ethnic and religious groups that ultimately developed into
genocidal violence.136 The second theory blames the turmoil in Yugoslavia throughout the ‘90s
on outsider intervention and past imperialism.137 The hatreds that began to develop in Yugoslavia
were based on “imperial manipulation rather than ethnic hostility.”138 However, as argued by
Tony Judt, these theories fail to account for the role of the Yugoslavs themselves. Throughout
Yugoslavia, there was some generalized discrimination towards the Albanian minority in the
South (strongest among those in Serbia), as well as a Northern distaste for the South, as they
were economically underachieving.139 In addition to financial mismanagement, the Republic also
began to crack when Slobodan Milošević became President of Serbia in 1989. Milošević
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absorbed two provinces within the Republic, which then allowed Serbia to have half of the eight
federal votes (Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and the compliant pro-Serbian Montenegro), leading
to the effective stalemate of the government.140 These factors led other states within the Republic
to consider declaring independence, such as Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992.141 These wars of independence eventually led to the displacement of over
two million people and to the deaths of thousands,142 as different ethnic groups fought other
groups to ensure their own protection.

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
The first of these wars was in Croatia. After Croatia declared independence, Serbs in the
state began to fear they would suffer, as they only represented 12% of the population.143 In order
to protect themselves, Croatian Serbs used military force to occupy about 33% of Croatian
territory, while simultaneously “[destroying] towns and cities, massacr[ing] defenseless civilians,
and [forcibly removing] ethnic groups from [their] territory.”144 However, the conflict in Croatia
was not only that of Serb aggression. During Operation Storm, Croatian forces retook Serb
territory, forcing over 150,000 Serbs to flee and “unlawfully killing” more than 100 civilians.145
The conflict in Croatia lasted about seven months,146 and led to the deaths of between 10,000 to
20,000 people, the fleeing of 200,000, and internal displacement of more than 300,000 people.147
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This was also when the term “ethnic cleansing” began to have widespread usage in the Western
world.148
A few months after the conflict in Croatia ended, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
began. This war lasted more than three years, and led to the deaths of over 100,000 people,
especially civilians.149 This war included a number of warring factions such as “Bosnian Serbs,
Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, regular army and paramilitary forces from Croatia and Serbia,
foreign mercenaries, UN troops, and NATO soldiers” (though the last two groups were careful to
avoid fighting)150 Beginning in April and May of 1992, the goal of the Bosnian Serb army, with
support from the Yugoslav Army and Serbia, was to “ethnically cleanse” all non-Serbs from
Bosnia.151
The ethnic cleansing perpetuated by the Bosnian Serbs led to a number of atrocities and
constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity.152 For example, in Sarajevo, the Bosnian
Serbs controlled part of the city as well as the surrounding mountains. The area of the city not
controlled by Serbs, but completely surrounded by them, was deprived of food, water, heat, UN
Humanitarian Aid, and other necessities. 153 The Serbs also attacked the area, killing men,
women, and children, as well as destroying Mosques and other cultural and religious
monuments.154 Bosnian Serbs also committed a number of other atrocities against Bosnian
Muslims, including ethnic cleansing campaigns in April of 1992. 155 Serbs would kill any
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non-Serb professionals, political leaders, and intellectuals.156 The rest were forced to flee the
area, and their houses were then destroyed.157 The Serbs also created detention camps, where
they would detain non-Serbs, who then faced overcrowding, beatings, torturings, murders,
malnutrition, and sexual abuse, such as gang rapes and sex slavery.158 Throughout these three
years, “more than half of Bosnia’s multi-ethnic population of 4.4 million people had been
displaced, an estimated 1.3 million were internally displaced; another half a million had fled to
neighboring countries, and some 700,000 had sought refuge in Western Europe.”159
It is important to note that all of the above ethnic groups committed war crimes, and “the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has initiated proceedings against all
members of all ethnic groups.”160 However, the Bosnian Serbs have committed the most number
of offenses during this period and committed the most heinous acts of genocide, and therefore, a
majority of ICTY indictments are directed against the Serbs. 161

Act of Genocides in Bosnia and Herzegovina?: The Case of Srebrenica
Within the Bosnia and Herzegovina war, there is one notable event that is unanimously
recognized by legal scholars and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as an act of genocide.
This event consists of the six days between July 13 and July 19, 1995, when over 7,000 mostly
civilian boys and men were systematically murdered from the UN Safe Area of Srebrenica. 162
Beginning in 1993, the population of Srebrenica, which had grown to an estimated
55,000-60,000 non-Serb and Muslim residents,163 was frequently attacked and shelled by the
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surrounding Bosnian Serb army.164 The Bosnian Serb army announced they would only cease
these attacks if those within the city would agree to relinquish their weapons to the UN and
become a “demilitarized zone.”165 The UN then declared Srebrenica a “safe area” on April 16,
1993, by passage of Resolution 819.166 The UN forming a safe area in the first place illustrates
that the UN acknowledged that ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity were occurring in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.167 However, a 1994 UN report by UN Secretary General, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, revealed that the UN could not actually guarantee the safety of these “safe
areas.”168 While the UN troops were authorized to use force to guarantee the safety in these areas,
they needed an estimated 34,000 troops in order to do so effectively.169 The UN only deployed
3,500 troops and UN commanders emphasized that force should be used to protect UN troops
within the safe area, rather than the civilians.170 On March 8, 1995, the Republika Srpska
president Radovan Karadžić authorized what was known as Directive No. 7, which ordered the
army to “create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or
life” for those who take refuge in the safe area of Srebrenica, as well as Zepa.171 This meant that
refugees often faced Serb shelling, food shortages, medical supply shortages, overcrowding, as
well as lack of other necessities, as the Serb army refused to allow aid convoys into the area.172
For example, UN convoys were being so restricted by the Bosnian Serbs that only one convoy
was allowed in per month and was somehow meant to feed over 39,000 people.173 Bosnian Serbs
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also forbade the delivery of salt so that the enclaves would not be able to preserve any food.174
These Serb microaggressions were witnessed by the UN peacekeepers, and therefore, the
international community; yet, nothing was ever done.
Beginning on July 11, with the Bosnian Serb invasion of this safe area, UN Peacekeepers
became bystanders and watched the following events unfold. First hand accounts given to
Human Rights Watch described that UN Peacekeepers were stripped to their underwear by
Bosnian Serbs, who then took and wore their UN uniforms in order to fool citizens into thinking
they were troops.175 Then on July 13, the Bosnian Serb army began to deport over 20,000
women, children, and elderly individuals into Muslim-controlled territory.176 Boys and men,
ranging from younger than sixteen to men well into their seventies, were separated and
considered to be “battle-aged” men (despite many of these men not being capable of military
fighting).177 These individuals were told that they would rejoin the rest of the group in
Muslim-controlled territory once they had been interrogated and it was determined if they had
committed “war crimes.”178 However, these 7,000 boys and men were instead transported from
Srebrenica to nearby execution sites, such as schools, factories, and meadows, where they were
denied food and water, beaten,179 and were eventually executed with machine guns.180 Any
survivors were rooted out by the Serb military and shot with pistols.181 After the killings,
excavators were brought in to pick up the hundreds of bodies and bring them to mass graves.182
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There were a number of massacre sites that these men could have been taken to upon
their removal from Srebrenica. The first is the Nova Kasaba-Konjevic Polje Area. Eight
photographs from around July 13th or 14th depict a crowd of people crowded onto a soccer field,
but days later, aircrafts detected an empty stadium with four patches of freshly disturbed earth.183
In addition, there were tracks from heavy vehicles that were not there before.184 An eyewitness
describes the massacre that happened there to Human Rights Watch, stating “They would just
line them up and shoot them into the pits. The approximately one hundred guys whom they
interrogated and who had dug the mass graves then had to fill them in. At the end of the day, they
were ordered to dig a pit for themselves and line up in front of it.”185 Another eyewitness
describes that those who surrendered were shot dead, as well as over 400 men who had been
buried alive.186 Another massacre occurred in the Karakaj area, where individuals were first
interrogated in Bratunac and then transported to Karakaj to be “interrogated, harassed, and
beaten”187 and finally killed by gun and bulldozed away.188 Bratunac also served as a massacre
area, however, in this area there were no eyewitness survivors to tell the story.189 Second-hand
accounts relay similar information as the massacres above. A UN soldier who was held in
Bratunac describes hearing Bosnian Serb guards brag about murdering people and raping
women.190 Another, who was the sister-in-law of a Bosnian Serb soldier, described how he would
speak openly about killing Muslims. She reports that he said they had probably killed an
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estimated 4,000 men, and since they were in such a hurry, would shoot most of them and then slit
the throats of those who were known to be “war criminals.”191
Following the Serb attack in Srebrenica, and the lack of international intervention, the
Bosnian Serb army then took over a second safe area, Zepa, where they again encountered no
international opposition.192 In fact, there was no international response to Srebrenica until a full
seven weeks later, on August 28th. 193 The response had nothing to do with the atrocities at
Srebrenica, but rather, it was a response to the second shelling of a Sarajevan marketplace.194
NATO, led by President Clinton, finally authorized a bombing campaign against Serbian
capacities.195 Eventually, peace talks began and the Dayton Accords were signed. From the
moment that fighting broke out in the early 1990s, human rights organizations and the media
were calling out to the international community to end the slaughter.196 While UN Peacekeeping
forces were sent in to help curb the fighting, the actual assistance was severely limited, due to
“restricted rules of engagement, limited resources, and interference from the warring parties, but
also by a lack of political will to apply the military means available.”197 Furthermore, the UN
intentionally destroyed video footage that depicted UN troops watching as Bosnian Serbs began
to massacre Muslim men.198 In 1999, the UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, released
a report assessing the UN’s role in protecting the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa.199 The report
criticizes member states for their lack of involvement in implementing resolutions, and greatly
criticized the Dutch UN Peacekeepers who stood aside while Srebrenica was captured.200
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In addition, the international community responded to the atrocities only after the fact by
forming the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, which was meant to investigate “war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide commited in the Yugoslav wars since 1991”; this
was actually the first international effort since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials to address war
crimes.201 Since the Tribunal’s establishment, there have been 161 indictments against
individuals for their actions in the former Yugoslavia, and the ICTY has finished proceedings
against 113 individuals (9 acquittals, 55 sentences, 13 sent for retrial in the former
Yugoslavia).202 While the number of cases is relatively small, the ICTY has played an
indispensable role in preserving history of the major atrocities that occurred during the wars in
the former Yugoslavia. 203
In March of 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina sued the government of Yugoslavia in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).204 The Court did not come to its decision until February 26,
2007, when it decided in a 175 page judgement that the only Serb action that constituted
genocide was their actions at Srebrenica.205 All other actions including sexual violence, detention
camps, and ethnic cleansing did not constitute genocide.206 The ICTY judges are in agreement
with the ICJ, and have only convicted a six individuals for genocide, as they could not prove the
mental intent requirement under the definition of genocide.207 Only the acts at Srebrenica showed
specific intent to “destroy a group in whole or in part.”208
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Kosovo
Following the above mentioned wars, in 1998, another war broke out in Kosovo, an
autonomous province, between the Serbs and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 209 The
conflict in Kosovo had been building since the 1980s, when Milošević came to power.210
Milošević encouraged the Kosovo Serbs, who felt that they had been wronged by the Kosovo
Albanian majority. He introduced anti-Albanian measures such as, the revocation of Kosovo’s
autonomous province status, the replacement of Albanian police forces with Serb police forces,
the closure of Albanian language centers, and the removal of Albanians from public employment
and educational spaces.211 By the Spring of 1997, the UN was well aware of the situation, as the
UN special rapporteur for human rights, Elizabeth Rehn, closely monitored the situation and
warned of “impending disaster.”212 After years of Serb oppression, the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) began to commit attacks on Serb police forces and Albanian collaborators. 213 By 1998,
the KLA had set up detention centers where Serbs and their collaborators were kept in
“inhumane conditions, tortured, and killed.”214 In retaliation, Serb forces mirrored their actions in
Bosnia by attacking villages, killing civilians, and burning houses.215 By the year's end, 300,000
Kosovo Albanians were forced to flee and over 3,000 had been killed. 216 By the end of the war,
800,000 Albanians had fled and hundreds of thousands had become internally displaced, and
5,000-30,000 are estimated to have been killed.217
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In the early summer of 1998, the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague announced it would
exercise their jurisdiction over the crimes in Kosovo, and “on July 19th, the US senate urged the
Hague official to indict Milošević with ‘war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.’”218
Six months after this, the Serbian government turned over Milošević to the Hague, where he was
charged with genocide and war crimes.219 While Slobodan Milošević was indicted by the ICTY,
the Court ultimately did not recognize the actions in Kosovo as genocide because the intent was
not to destroy a part or all of the Albanian ethnic group, but rather to forcefully remove them
from Kosovo.220
Totaling at over 140,000 deaths and 4 million displaced221 (though some observers have
higher numbers) in this short ten year period, it is truly a wonder why the United Nations did not
take more concrete steps to actively end the turmoil in Yugoslavia. Why is it that out of all the
massacres and genocidal acts seen throughout the period that the situation in Srebrenica is the
only event legally recognized and prosecuted as genocide? While the terrible atrocities that
occured in this ten year period were mostly the fault of young, hateful Serb men,222 one cannot
casually ignore the responsibility of the United Nations, who was sworn to protect human rights
and international peace.

Why did it take so long for the UN to intervene?
After examining the case studies of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, it is easy to wonder: how
can something like this happen under the United Nation’s watchful eye? It can be hard to
reconcile the idea of “never again” that was championed by the United Nations when it is in
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stark contrast to what actually happened throughout the twentieth century. Scholars attempt to
explain this disconnect in a number of ways.

Limitations of the Genocide Convention
One of the main criticisms in terms of the lack of UN intervention actually comes from
the limitations imposed by the definition of genocide. As previously mentioned, genocide
requires an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,”
by acts such as killing, causing bodily or mental harm, deliberately causing “conditions of life
calculated to bring about [a group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part,” imposing
sterilization methods, and separating children.223 Under this definition, there are a few problems
that arise. First and foremost is the extremely narrow defintion of genocide. Since the
establishment of the Convention, there have been numerous debates over what is actually
covered by this definition and what situation constitutes genocide.224 In this narrow definition,
there are two main elements that must be met: 1) a mental “intent to destroy,” or dolus specialis,
and 2) a physical element such as killing or causing harm to bring about a group’s destruction.225
Under this definition, it is incredibly hard for a state or international body to establish the
perpetrator’s intent.226 Note also that under the current definition of genocide within the
Convention, cultural destruction, the persecution of political groups, and the intention to disperse
a group (i.e. ethnic cleansing) do not suffice as genocide.227 From previous case law, intent is also
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often associated “with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy.”228 Due to this
narrow definition, critics have argued that the Convention has too limited of a scope.229 With the
difficulties that arise from trying to prove dolus specialis, the Convention has become ineffective
in reducing mass atrocities as it is incredibly difficult to prove someone’s intent230 without the
presence of expressed intent in writings, speeches, or organizational plans and policies of the
state.231
Supporters of using the aspect of dolus specialis in the Convention argue that, by
requiring this intent, genocide is separated from “lesser” crimes, such as crimes against
humanity.232 However, as previously stated, dolus specialis makes it incredibly difficult for the
Genocide Convention to actually prevent and end genocide. Because intent refers to an
individual’s private state of mind, it is extremely difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that an individual is intending to commit genocide.233 Therefore, perpetrators are very careful in
making sure that their actions are not publicly proclaimed as intending to destroy a part of or
entire group.234 This technicality is exemplied by the case of Yugoslavia, where individuals who
directly participated in genocide were tried for a lesser crime because it could not be proven that
they had genocidal intentions (with the exception of certain individuals in the case of
Srebrenica).235 Due to this limitation, many in the international community have called to change
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the dolus specialis requirement to one that is more of a knowledge-based approach.236 Under this
approach, if an individual commits a “prohibited act with the knowledge that it would further a
genocidal plan,” they would satisfy the intent requirement of the Genocide Convention and
could, therefore, be charged with genocide.237 In the case of Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic during
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Prosecutor did attempt to
introduce a knowledge-based approach to intent, but was rejected by the Court, as the perpetrator
seemed to kill arbitrarily and did not kill only one group.238 Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Radislav
Krstić, Krstić, who was originally charged with genocide for his actions in Srebrenica, had his
conviction overruled by the Appeals Chamber who stated there was no dolus specialius, “but
only his knowledge of the other perpetrators’ genocidal intent.” 239 He was therefore only
convicted for aiding and abetting genocide, like so many of the prepertrators in the Yugoslav
wars.240 Without a judge accepting a knowledge-based approach, there is no precedent to
compare this approach to dolus specialis to see if it would be better suited for prosecuting
genocide.
However, due to the fact that prosecution under the current Genocide Convention is so
difficult, one may wonder why the courts have refused to accept a knowledge-based approach
instead of dolus specialis, which would help to make the prosecution of genocide much easier.
Could this be an oversight on behalf of the UN or could this lack of change be intentional?
History suggests that this may be intentional. In the 1998 Rome Conference, states were given “a
golden opportunity” to fix “blind spots” found in the Genocide Convention, however, they
236
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refused to do so.241 The only proposed amendment at the Conference came from Cuba, who
argued for the inclusion of social and political groups, while every other country supported the
original document.242 Is this because the UN did not want to close a loophole that allowed for
justification of their inaction? Being that the narrowness of the definition of genocide, and the
difficulties that emerge from the issue of intent have been long criticized by academics and
activists alike, it seems odd that states refused to make any amendment to the Convention in
1998.243 This may lead one to wonder if states’ actions in leaving the definition intentionally
narrow and hard to prosecute is by design.

State Sovereignty
One of the hardest things to overcome when trying to garner international action in the
face of genocide is state sovereignty. Beginning in the 1990s, there was a shift between the
balance of state sovereignty and human rights.244 In international society, state sovereignty stands
as one of the most important values as it “authenticates a political order based on independent
states whose governments are the principal authorities both domestically and internationally.”245
Because of this, intervention on the ground of human rights issues within a country’s own
borders is generally rare.246 Even within the UN Charter, this preference of state sovereignty over
human rights is exemplified.247 Article 2 of the UN Charter, which grants all Member states equal
sovereignty, states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
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or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”248 In a
continuance of emphasizing sovereignty overall, the UN stated in the Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation that “No State or group of
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
the external affairs of any other State.”249 However, the UN Charter does allow for an exception
to this rule under chapter 7, where they state there can be an exception to the rule of sovereignty
when the Security Council determines that there is a threat to peace and security.250 It is
important to note that this threat must be determined and agreed upon unanimously by the
Permanent Five in the Security Council in order for it to supersede a state’s sovereignty. It is also
important to note that when examining the UN Charter, states are legally bound to respect the
sovereignty of a state and refrain from interference, whereas states are only encouraged to
promote human rights throughout states (though not required).251
For example, during the Cold War, the two opposing sides, the United States and USSR,
worked to make sure that states would join their “camp.” This led to the United States to ignore
human rights violations as long as that state had allegiance to the Western (United States)
ideology.252 These policies were further perpetuated in the UN as human rights issues took the
backseat. Human rights groups within the UN, such as the Human Rights Commission,
possessed no real power to investigate member states or protect human rights.253 Emphasis on
human rights within the world order did not emerge again until the 1970s, when groups such as
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Amnesty International became prominent.254 Once the Cold War dissolved and the United States
reigned victorious, the Western allies made human rights an entry requirement for those wanting
to join either NATO or the EU.255 However, this did not dissolve the preference towards
sovereignty. Sovereignty continued to be favored as “all states have an interest in ensuring that
territories remain under the effective control of a government, regardless of its human rights
record.”256
Under UN protocol and international norms, the concept of sovereignty is irreconcilable
with the idea of intervention.257 Under sovereignty, states have the right to govern their own
territory without the interference of others. State sovereignty means a government has the
ultimate power over the “people, resources, and all other authorities within the territory it
controls.”258 This means they can engage in certain practices (like genocide) under the guise of
maintaining “law and order” or preserving “the territorial integrity of the state.”259 As stated by
Leo Kuper, a specialist in the study of genocide, “the structure and ideology of the UN,
particularly its protective stance in relation to the sovereign rights of the territorial state, [stands]
in the way of effective action.”260 In the two cases studies described previously, the UN
generally preferred to accept the predisposition towards state sovereignty rather than human
rights, which was exhibited through their actions and attitudes towards intervention. However,
preference towards a state’s sovereignty may actually be an excuse used by UN member states to
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justify inaction. More likely, UN inaction can be explained by states within the UN basing
intervention on a cost/benefit analysis of their own national interest, as will be explored later.

Institutional and Structural Failures
While the limitations of the Genocide Convention and the dichotomy between state
sovereignty and human rights play a large role in the UN’s failure to intervene in the cases of
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the ultimate failure arises from the structural and institutional failures
of the United Nations as a whole. To begin with, the fault of lack of intervention falls onto the
member states, who often delay or deter prevention through their disagreements.261 This is
especially true of the permanent members of the Security Council.262
Before I begin my discussion on the institutional failures of the UN, I would first like to
explain the actual structuring of the UN, and how this structuring could lead to problems. The
United Nation is made up of a number of committees, but its two main components consist of the
General Assembly (all member states) and the Security Council. The structure of the UN
Security Council is outlined in the UN Charter under Chapter V: The Security Council, Articles
23-32. There are fifteen member countries in the UN Security Council (UNSC), ten of which are
determined on a two year rotating basis and five who hold permanent seats.263 These permanent
members include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia (mentioned
in the charter as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).264 The main responsibility of the
UNSC is to ensure “the maintenance of international peace and security.”265 Decisions of the
UNSC are determined through a voting process. Procedural matters are decided by an affirmative
261
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vote of nine of the fifteen countries. All other matters “shall be made by an affirmative vote of
nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent member.”266 This essentially
translates to a veto power, or a rule of “great power unanimity,” belonging to the permanent
members of the UNSC on all matters other than procedural.267 This means that if one of the five
permanent member states casts a negative vote in any non-procedural decision or resolution, that
decision or resolution will not be passed.268
The founders of the UN formed the Security Council in this way for a reason. Learning
from the failures and mistakes of the League of Nations, the Dumbarton Oak writers proposed
that the Security Council have primary responsibility over maintaining international peace and
security.269 The Council was made intentionally small so they could “‘act speedily and decisively
in time of crisis without interference from the General Assembly.” 270 In contrast to the League of
Nations, the UN Security Council also has final say on decisions regarding “prevention and
suppression of aggression.”271 In order to achieve these goals, the permanent five great powers
were given a veto power that allowed them to make sure that all important decisions went
through them first.272 When the UN Charter began to be finalized at the San Francisco
Conference, multiple states argued to amend the balance of power between the permanent five
Security Council member states and the General Assembly. 273 Despite these disagreements, the
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permanent five refused to change their stance, as they did not want to weaken “the prestige,
efficiency, and power of the Council.”274
Ever since its conception, the veto power has led to a number of controversies between
supporters and critics. Supporters of the veto argue that it allows for the UN to maintain
international stability and ensures that important decisions involving war and peace happen by
consensus.275 Furthermore, the establishment of the veto power ensures that the UN can exist.
Without the veto power to protect national interests, it is unlikely that the major powers would
have agreed on an international body that binds “legal authority on matters of peace and
security.”276 Critics, on the other hand, see the veto power differently than its supporters: usually
as a power that leads to a superiority of the permanent five. For example, many of the smaller
member states of the UN have argued that the veto power given to the permanent five is a
violation of “democracy and sovereign equality” among states.277 It argued that “it was
preposterous that a single great power should be able to block action in the peaceful settlement of
a dispute to which it was not a party.”278 Other countries also argue that the Security Council is
meant to favor the powerful and bigger states, and many of these smaller states argue that the
veto should ultimately be abolished to make the UN more democratic.279 The institutional veto
power has ultimately led to the permanent five having substantial power over the other member
states of the General Assembly and over the ten non-permanent Security Council members.
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National Interests and Lack of Cooperation/Agreement among the Permanent Five
The institutional establishment of the veto power in the United Nations has led to a
non-democratic ‘international’ body dominated by the five major powers. This has led to an
extremely unequal balance of power where decisions that benefit the major five’s national
interests are favored, and their lack of cooperation has lead to stalemates and inaction (even in
the favor of genocide). The veto allows for the permanent members of the UNSC to “defend
their national interests, to uphold a tenet of their foreign policy or, in some cases, to promote a
single issue of particular importance to a state.”280 The decisions to intervene must be approved
by the UN Security Council, and therefore, these decisions often default to the permanent five’s
national interests and whether intervention would help or hinder those interests.281 The national
interests of these powerful nations, especially the US, UK, and France, have even been described
as the “will of the international community.”282 For example, a US congressional official in a
conversation with Monique Mujawamariya (a Rwandan human rights activist and genocide
survivor) about the lack of intervention in the Rwandan Genocide stated: “the United States has
no friends. The United States has interests. And in the United States, there is no interest in
Rwanda. And we are not interested in sending young American Marines to bring them back in
coffins. We have no incentive."283 Where there was no interest, there was no intervention. As
previously discussed, the Rwandan Genocide ended by an RPF takeover, and not by an
international intervention force.
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However, the readiness to blame lack of UN intervention due to the permanent five’s
national security interests should be taken lightly. While it remains true that the permanent five’s
national security interests do influence UN security council decisions, it must be acknowledged
that these interests cannot influence decisions too greatly, especially if those interests are against
what the majority of the UN wants. In order for the United Nations to function, the UNSC must
have the support of other member states.284 If the permanent five were to continuously make
decisions that opposed the wants of member states, those states would have little incentive to
continue supporting the UN financially, militarily, or politically285 (though, it is important to note
that this is a very delicate balance, as a majority of states within the General Assembly know it
would be disadvantageous to leave the UN and antagonize the greater powers). So while the
permanent five’s interests do play a role in determining intervention in a crisis, including its
intensity and location, it would be exaggerated to claim that the UN is “nothing but an
instrument for the advancement of parochial great power interests,”286 and that UN decisions are
made solely on the basis of national interests.
In addition to competing national interests, the members of the permanent five often
differ ideologically, which can lead to a lack of cooperation in decision making. From the birth
of the UN in 1945 up until the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Security Council was “crippled
by big-power politics.”287 The ideological differences between the United States and the United
Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) made it incredibly difficult for the UNSC to successfully
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respond to international situations, especially when these two powers used their veto to “further
their political views.”288 Furthermore, the two superpowers (US and USSR) were resistant to the
possibility of the United Nations acting in the regional conflicts where either state had “political
or military interest.”289 During the Cold War period, acts of genocide were committed with little
resistance from the UN, as the US and USSR were working to protect their own interests and
allies. In more recent times, the interests of the Permanent Five members generally involve
conflicts occurring in Africa and the Middle East. 290 After the NATO intervention in Libya in
2011, Russia and China became strongly opposed to resolutions authorizing “‘all necessary
means’ for the protection of civilians,” as they feared this could lead to regime change that
would no longer benefit them.291 The veto given to the permanent members of the UN Security
Council allows for each power to protect their own spheres of influence and to protect their allies
(ex. US often vetoes matters involving Israel to protect them, and Russia does the same for
Syria).292
The veto power of the United Nations Security Council has allowed for the Permanent
Five to protect their national interests when considering the situations and resolutions brought
before it. These states have substantial power over the General Assembly and Non-Permanent
members of the UNSC, as they ultimately decide what decisions pass and which do not. Due to
this power imbalance and lack of equal state sovereignty, there have been a number of calls to
reform the Permanent Five’s veto power, even including reform calls from one of its own
288
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members. France proposed to limit the powers of the veto first in 2012. President François
Hollande proposed that in the event of mass crimes (only including genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes on a large scale) the Security Council “can decide to collectively
renounce their veto powers.”293 It also provides the conditional that if a Permanent Five member
decides to use the veto in these situations due to vital national interests, it must also provide a
public explanation for why they chose to do so.294 In addition to France, there have been calls
from other member states of the United Nations to reform the veto power of the Permanent Five,
such as the following states: Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland,
which have been nicknamed the Small Five (S5).295 However, it is incredibly unlikely that the
veto power will ever be reformed or removed. To reform or remove the veto power, the UN
Charter would have to be amended, which would require ratification by 2/3s of the UN member
states, including the permanent five.296 Even in that scenario, the P5 could then use their veto
power against any amendment to ensure the protection of their “privileged position.”297

The Institutional Failures of the UN in Practice
These institutional failures of the UN described above are exemplified in their debates
regarding Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In the case of Rwanda, the UN Security Council held off on
intervention due to their respect for Rwanda’s status as a sovereign state. Rwanda was an active
member of the United Nations, and President Habyarimana’s government was recognized by the
UN as a legitimate sovereign authority.298 At the time, Rwanda was even allowed to maintain its
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position as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, illustrating that the UN possessed
more respect for Rwanda’s sovereignty than it did for Rwanda’s people.299 In the case of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the UN Security Council (UNSC) disagreed on a number of things, such as the
actual state of the conflict (was this ethnic cleansing or interstate aggression by Serbia and
Croatia?), debate over whether the fighting was that of a civil war or of external aggressions,
debate over who were the victims and perpetrators, as well as Bosnia’s sovereign authority.300 In
Kosovo, the UN Security Council continued to be in disagreement over what action to take.
While arguments raged in the General Assembly as to whether Kosovo was an internal crisis or
one of ethnic cleansing, the UNSC had already decided that it was more important to preserve
Kosovo’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”301 The main reason cited for UNSC’s refusal to
authorize humanitarian intervention was because of the conflict between state sovereignty and
human rights,302 and threats of vetoes from Russia as the “geography and politics rendered
unanimity by the permanent members in support of military action (especially in the Balkans)
highly unlikely.”303

Conclusion
Did the UN take any action to fix the above problems?
Following the many atrocities of the twentieth century, the United Nations did engage in
conversations about issues such as the definitional technicalities of the Genocide Convention, as
well as their failure to intervene in situations where they were most needed. However, the
outcomes of these deliberations are mixed. To reemphasize, in 1998, after the limitations of the
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Genocide Convention were well known by the UN due to the fact that situations like Rwanda
and Yugoslavia were still able to occur, the U.N was given the opportunity to remedy the
Genocide Convention’s limitations at the Rome Conference. They refused to alter the
Convention, and left it as is.304
However, the UN did seem to recognize some of the faults of their actions throughout the
twentieth century in 2005 when they passed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine, which
supplements the Genocide Convention. The R2P Doctrine is “an international norm that seeks to
ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”305 The R2P Doctrine
establishes two principles. The first, which harkens back to the importance of state sovereignty,
is that each state has its own individual responsibility to protect its people from “genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”306 The second principle expresses that if a
state is unwilling to do the above actions, then it becomes the responsibility of the international
community to protect the population of that state from the above crimes.307 The R2P Doctrine’s
greatest benefit is that it “explicitly eliminates the specific intent requirement” that is found in
the Genocide Convention, which allows for states to act in situations where there is no
established intent of destruction.308 In addition, the R2P Doctrine also allows for states or
international organizations to exercise force without having to go through the Security Council,
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as long as the guiding principles are met and the intervening state clearly justifies their
intentions.309 The Doctrine also provides protection to all human beings facing extreme suffering,
rather than just the four protected groups listed under the Genocide Convention.310 Finally, the
R2P Doctrine also establishes standards that make it so one state cannot attack another under the
guise of protecting the attacked state’s population. The Doctrine calls for states to establish a
“right intention” principle, which means that the main reason for intervention is to “halt or avert
human suffering.”311
Since its passage in 2005, the UN General Assembly has overwhelmingly reaffirmed its
commitment to the R2P Doctrine, and it has been referenced in more than 80 UN Security
Council resolutions for multiple crises, as well as in resolutions “concerning the prevention of
genocide, prevention of armed conflict and restricting the trade of small arms and light
weapons.”312 It seems to have become a cornerstone piece in relation to genocide and war crime
prevention.
The UN in Action Today: The Case of the Rohingyas in Myanmar and Uyghurs in China
Despite the adoption of the R2P Doctrine, the United Nations and the international
community have continued to fail in stopping genocide and mass atrocities in the twenty-first
century. While there have been a number of mass atrocities in the last twenty years, for the
purposes of this conclusion I will only be focusing on their failures using two examples: the
Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and the Uyghur Muslims in China.
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Beginning in 1974, the Parliament of Myanmar (then known as Burma) passed an
Emergency Immigration Act that limited the rights of “foreigners.” 313 Under this Immigration
Act, Rohingyas were to be considered foreigners and their registration cards (the document that
confirmed citizenship) were confiscated.314 Throughout the late 1970s, the military then
terrorized the Rohingya population and destroyed their homes.315 Then in 1982, the government
passed a Citizenship Law, which purposely excluded the Rohingyas from citizenship.316 Now
considered foreigners, the government was able to limit a Rohingya’s freedoms, such as the right
to travel, right to education, and right to own property.317 The Rohingya also faced deportation,
evictions, unemployment, and discrimination.318 Following this law, the military then launched
Operation Pyi Thaya in 1991, where soldiers committed “widespread violence”319 against the
Rohingya, including harassment, police violence, sexual abuse, and deaths while in custody.320
This continued for almost two decades, and in 2008, the UN Human Rights Council announced
that the Rohingya were being “subjected to political, economic, religious and social repression
by the authorities.”321
In 2017, violence again erupted between the Rohingyas and the government. The
Myanmar government, along with local Buddhist mobs, began to burn villages, attack and kill
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Rohingyas, and rape and abuse young women and girls.322 Over 6,700 Rohingya individuals,
including 730 individuals under the age of five, were killed after a month of violence.323 A UN
fact-finding mission determined that the actions taken against the Rohingya constituted
genocidal intent.324 Others, such as the United States, have also formally labelled the actions in
Myanmar as genocide.325 Despite this, the international community had little response other than
economic and political sanctions.326 Resolutions brought before the UNSC were vetoed, or
threatened to be vetoed, by Russia and China, “stating that the issue was a domestic affair of
Myanmar and not a threat to regional or international peace and security.”327 Therefore, no
humanitarian action was taken by the UN in the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar.
Similarly, China has also been persecuting the Muslim population known as the Uyghurs
(also spelled Uighur), who inhabit the north-western region of China, Xinjiang. The Uyghur
population in China has been facing persecution since 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party
came to power, and became actively categorized as terrorists in the 1990s.328 The Uyghurs were
continually discriminated against for the next two decades, and in July of 2009, ethnic riots in the
capital led to over 200 people dying.329 This turning point later led to policies such as the 2014
Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism, which allowed for “increased amount of
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surveillance, with roadblocks and checkpoints, confiscation of Uyghurs’ passports, and the
introduction of ‘people’s convenience cards’ that restricted Uyghurs’ freedom of movement.” 330
In 2017, the Chinese government began its most criticized phase of the Uyghur
persecution by beginning to build massive detention centers, referred to as reeducation camps,331
where they have detained more than one million Uyghur individuals.332 Leaked documents,
referred to as the China Cables, revealed that these camps were actually meant to be “high
security prisons, with strict discipline and punishments.”333 This seems to be the case, as former
detainees testify to forced labor, mass rape and sexual violence, beatings, and physical, mental,
and sexual torture.334 It is also thought that a number of individuals have been killed in the camp,
but there have been no reliable estimates.335
In addition, a report by Chinese scholar, Adrian Zenz, outlines the number of abuses
against Uyghur women, including forced surgical sterilization, sterilization by drug injection,
and forced IUD implementation.336 There have also been reports of children being removed from
parents and sent to state institutions or full-time boarding schools.337 The international response
to China’s genocidal acts against the Uyghurs have been far and wide with countries such as the
United States, Canada, Netherlands,338 Czech Republic, Lithuania, Belgium and the United
Kingdom339 accusing China of committing genocide. Former US Secretary of State, Mike
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Pompeo has called for China to end their “horrific practices” and for the international community
“to join the United States in demanding an end to these dehumanizing abuses."340 Many countries
have issued economic sanctions, travel bans, asset freezes, and diplomatic boycotts of the 2022
Winter Olympics in Beijing.341 Despite these measures, it is unlikely that any UN action will be
taken against China for their genocidal conduct. Any action taken by the UN must be approved
by the Security Council. In this instance, China will veto any proposed resolutions and the
genocide will be allowed to continue.
While the UN has attempted to reform its humanitarian processes through documents like
the R2P Doctrine, it has continually failed to stop instances of mass atrocities and genocide, as
exemplified by the Rohingyas in Myanmar and the Uyghurs in China. The UN has been a major
force and stabilizer in many international realms, however, they are incredibly ineffective in their
handling of human rights abuses. The veto has proven to be an extremely unproductive tool, and
has allowed for genocidal actions to continue as states prioritize their own national interests. If
the UN seriously wants to become a more effective body in the area of human rights, the body as
a whole, and more specifically the permanent members of the Security Council, need to consider
veto power reform. If one were to remove the veto power from the Permanent Five, it would
make it much harder for these ideologically different countries to protect their national interests
over human rights abuses. In addition, the UN as a whole needs to resolve the tension between
their commitment to human rights and bowing before the absolute of state sovereignty. Whether
individuals are killed in a genocide within one’s border should not matter. The UN must uphold
their promise to protect human rights. Promises like the R2P Doctrine are a good start, but the
UN needs to add more effective action to back up their doctrines. Policy doctrines mean nothing
340
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when no real action follows. Finally, the UN needs to reconsider the dolus specialis approach in
the Genocide Convention. Dolus specialis makes it too difficult to prosecute genocide, as
individuals know how to avoid prosecution by not explicitly stating their intentions. Rather, the
UN should adopt a knowledge-based approach, where one can be charged with genocide if they
can reasonably foresee that their actions could constitute genocide. This will allow for more war
criminals to be rightfully prosecuted and for victims of genocide to receive justice.
The promise of never again has been betrayed over and over again. Genocides continue
to this day, and they will keep continuing if the UN allows authoritarian governments to exploit
and destroy their citizens. After the many genocides of the twentieth century, including in
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, it is time the UN re-evalutate apsects of its institutional structuring and
its founding documents. It is time they re-evaluate the Genocide Convention to make it more
effective in stopping present day genocides. It is time they prioritize human rights over the rights
of the state. It is time they actually uphold the concept of never again.
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